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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN UNDER
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRESENT
STANDARDS & FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
INTRODUCTION
The American woman's struggle for equal rights can be
viewed as part of a worldwide movement towards the recogni-
tion of equality between the sexes. On a broader scale, this
worldwide movement is but one part of a trend aimed at elimi-
nating discrimination in general. In addition to the initiatives
taken within individual countries, nations have been collec-
tively attempting to wipe out sex-based discrimination through
multilateral action, most notably by means of international
conventions.
In its analysis of this move towards equality, this comment
will first examine the current status of women's rights as de-
fined by American constitutional law. Following this discus-
sion, it will briefly consider the impact the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) would have on this body of deci-
sional law.
Thereafter, this comment will turn to the international
arena focusing on existing international treaty law involving
women's rights, as well as a draft convention which contem-
plates a sweeping prohibition of sex-based discrimination, sim-
ilar in scope to the proposed ERA.
The purpose of this latter focus is to inform individuals
interested in women's rights that there are international reme-
dies-in addition to national ones-available in the struggle for
equality. Although the United States has long refrained from
becoming a party to these international treaties or conventions,
there are signs that this reluctance is easing. Since United
States recognition of these international standards will, hope-
fully, aid the movement for ERA ratification, it is more impor-
tant than ever that individuals become aware of them. Also, if
acceded to, these agreements will become an integral part of
the law of the land, at which time their relevance becomes
indisputable.
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The scope of rights accorded women under the Constitu-
tion has been subject to varying interpretations by the United
States Supreme Court during the past eleven decades. These
high court decisions, customarily decided on equal protection
grounds,' have been attacked for their lack of perspective con-
cerning the harmful effects of sex discrimination, with at least
one critic asserting that male judges decide these issues from
a narrow viewpoint and under certain psychological handi-
caps.' However, the last several years have witnessed a greater
recognition of the need for sexual equality, which has been met
by a corresponding number of judicial decisions striking down
sex-based classifications.
The Beginning: 1873-1970
In Bradwell v. Illinois,3 a woman's application for a license
to practice law was denied solely on the grounds of sex. The
Supreme Court, declaring that the right to practice law was not
one of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment, reasoned that the granting of licenses was
solely within the jurisdiction of the individual states. In the
Court's view, the individual states were free to define the prere-
1. Although sex discrimination cases are traditionally litigated using equal pro-
tection theory, the Court has upon occasion employed a different constitutional princi-
ple as the basis for its decisions. These other theories often reflect the era in which
the case is decided: For example, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873),
was a privileges and immunities case involving a fourteenth amendment argument
which no longer appears in the Court's decisions. Also, the Burger Court's "irrebutable
presumption" doctrine has been used to decide discrimination cases, although it has
been argued that this theory is in essence equal protection under a different name. See
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).
When federal statutes are challenged, the fourteenth amendment is inapplicable;
however, "[w]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does
forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'"
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973) (quoting Schneider v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163, 168 (1964)); see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
2. Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 744-45 (1971). The authors list six reasons why
male judges encounter difficulty seeing the harmful effect of sex discrimination: (1)
lack of knowledge; (2) overgeneralization from personal experience; (3) personal atti-
tudes of which they are not aware; (4) competition from women as a group may seem
to threaten the judges' interests; (5) difficulty empathizing with female complaintants;
and (6) general hostility to change, especially of such a fundamental and far-reaching
character as to transform radically the basic institutions of society. Id. at 741-44.
3. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
RIGHTS OF WOMEN
quisites that must be satisfied to pursue a particular occupa-
tion.' In the now-notorious concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Bradley, the "paramount destiny and mission of woman" was
proclaimed:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupa-
tions of civil life . . . The harmony, not to say identity,
of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to
the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of
her husband.'
Although Bradwell has never been expressly overruled, it
has since been established that the equal protection doctrine
applies to state regulations of bar admissions; therefore, such
arbitrary denial would now be unconstitutional.' However,
within the great expanse of nearly one hundred years following
the Bradwell decision and up to the "turning point" marked by
Reed v. Reed7 in 1971, the Supreme Court upheld all sex-based
classifications. These decisions were marked by an almost rev-
erent deference to the legislature, as evidenced by the cursory
dismissal of challenges, raising even the most serious constitu-
tional issues, on the basis of inadequately supported conclu-
sions that a rational connection did exist between sex discrimi-
nation and the promotion of some vaguely articulated state
interest.8
Statutes challenged during this period involved some re-
striction or denial of rights based solely on sex-rights which
were not similarly curtailed with respect to the male gender
4. Id. at 139.
5. Id. at 141. In the only other case on the subject, In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116
(1894), a unanimous Court upheld Virginia's denial of bar membership to a woman
who had already been admitted to the District of Columbia and U.S. Supreme Court
bars.
6. Johnston & Knapp, supra note 2, at 681.
7. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
8. The judiciary has traditionally used several forms of rationalization to uphold
state legislation that excludes or disadvantages females with respect to various occupa-
tions or offices. These include: (1) reliance on the myth of male supremacy; (2) total
deference to the legislature; (3) cursory dismissal of serious constitutional issues on the
basis that a rational connection exists between sex discrimination and the promotion
of a state interest. Johnston & Knapp, supra note 2, at 697. In addition, courts have
often based decisions on "averaging," doing gross injustice to those individuals who
are not "average." B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINA-
TION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 105 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK].
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and were important elements in one's daily existence. Typical
among these rights were the choice of certain occupations,9 the
corresponding right to equal educational opportunity, 0 and the
right to be considered on an equal basis in the jury-selection
process." Because the sex-based classification was always up-
held, Supreme Court performance during this period has been
rated by one scholar as "poor to abominable."' 2
The Thrning Point and Beyond: 1971-1977
Sex-based classifications. Legal scholars have strongly
maintained that sex-based classifications should be subjected
to a stricter scrutiny than that which is mandated by the tradi-
tional rational relationship test. 3 If strict scrutiny were ap-
plied, the state would have to show a compelling reason for
distinguishing between males and females.
Race is the classic suspect classification, and one of the
most oft-cited arguments for applying strict scrutiny to sex-
based classifications is that gender can be analogized to race."
Most authorities do acknowledge that there are areas-e.g.,
9. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding statute that denied
most women the right to work as bartenders); In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894)
(denying women the right to practice law). Cf. Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485
P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (Alcoholic Beverage Commission's revocation of
liquor license from establishment for hiring female bartenders violates equal protection
clause and is therefore unconstitutional).
10. In Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D. S.C. 1970), affd mem., 401 U.S.
951 (1971), the Court stated that equal protection had not been violated where men
were denied admission to an all-female state college, where there were coeducational
universities within the system. Cf. Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (Univ. of Va.'s denial to females of educational rights
equal to those of males violates equal protection clause).
11. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (sustaining statute allowing women to be
excluded from jury duty unless they sign up).
12. Johnston & Knapp, supra note 2, at 675. In contrast, cases decided between
1971 and 1974 were rated by Professor Johnston as "acceptable to inexcusably poor";
the 1974 term as "tolerable to good." Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme
Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617 (1974); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the
Supreme Court-1975, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 235 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Johnston-
1975].
13. The rational relationship or reasonableness test traditionally asks: (1) Did
the legislature have a constitutionally-permissible purpose in view in passing the law
in question, and (2) Is the classification used reasonably related to accomplishing that
purpose? Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. REv.
341 (1949). Stated another way, "A reasonable classification is one which includes all
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law." Id. at 346.
14. BABcoCK, supra note 8, at 89. See also Johnston & Knapp, supra note 2, at
738-41; Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment? 84 HARv. L. REv. 1499, 1507-08 (1971).
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laws governing sexual conduct and familial relationships-
where societal interests may arguably command a distinction
based on sex though not on race. However, in the areas of
education, employment, and the judicial process, where inher-
ent sexual or racial differences are not relevant, the sex-race
parallel is persuasive. 5
The arbitrary character of sex-based classifications is evi-
dent if one substitutes "race" for "sex" in a challenged statute.
In Reed v. Reed, " the issue presented was whether the Idaho
legislature could validly give preference to males over females
in the appointment of administrators of estates. If such prefer-
ence had been accorded caucasians, the invidiousness of the
statute becomes immediately apparent and it would never be
permitted to stand. 7
However, even without a strict scrutiny analysis, the Reed
Court struck down the sex-based classification. Rejecting the
contention that the statute decreased the workload of probate
courts by saving them time in choosing an administrator,"
Chief Justice Burger stated:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimi-
nation of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and what-
ever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intra-
family controversy, the choice in this context may not law-
fully be mandated solely on the basis of sex . ... 1
This decision marks the first time the Court invalidated a
statute on grounds of sex-based discrimination.0 What level of
scrutiny did the Court apply to achieve this breakthrough?
While the Court appeared to employ traditional rational rela-
tionship terminology, the majority demanded more of the legis-
lature than a plausibly conceivable purpose. The majority
stated that the classification was "subject to scrutiny" and,
15. Johnston & Knapp, supra note 2, at 741.
16. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
17. Johnston & Knapp, supra note 2, at 696-97.
18. The Idaho Supreme Court had accepted this administrative efficiency
rationale. See Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970).
19. 404 U.S. at 76-77.
20. It is noteworthy that Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1971), had preceded Reed by six months, supporting the proposition that
Sail'er Inn and other state cases helped pave the way for Reed.
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although acknowledging that the saving of the judiciary's time
could be considered a rational legislative purpose, ruled that
this rationale was not sufficient to uphold the statute's consti-
tutionality." Thus, it appears that the new test applied a more
stringent standard than warranted under traditional rational
relationship analysis. However, it was something more lenient
than a compelling state interest, which the acceptance of a
race-sex analogy would have demanded.2
In 1973, the question of the validity of sex-based classifica-
tions was once again before the Court in Frontiero v.
Richardson." Here the issue turned on the right of a female
member of the uniformed services to claim her spouse as a
"dependent" for purposes of obtaining increased benefits, a
right granted male members of the services.2" Justice Brennan,
writing for four members of the Court,25 followed Reed by re-
jecting a defense of the statute based upon administrative effi-
ciency.26 However, he broke new ground when he declared that
sex, like "classifications based upon race, alienage or national
origin, [is] inherently suspect, and must therefore be sub-
jected to strict judicial scrutiny."27
In accepting the race-sex analogy, Justice Brennan further
reasoned that sex, like race and national origin, was an
"immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth."28 In addition, Title VII and the ERA were cited to sug-
gest that Congress had itself concluded that sex-based classifi-
cations were inherently invidious, a factor which the majority
found quite significant."
It is regrettable that Justice Brennan's view has never
commanded more than the four votes it summoned in
Frontiero. Thus, as far as United States constitutional preced-
ent is concerned, it never enjoyed the recognition of a majority
21. 404 U.S. at 76.
22. Professor Gunther has labeled this middle level of scrutiny "rational relation-
ship with a bite." Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1972).
23. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
24. Id. at 678.
25. Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall constituted the majority.
26. 411 U.S. at 684.
27. Id. at 682.
28. Id. at 686 (citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)).
29. Id. at 687-88 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (b), (c) (Title VII); H.R.J. Res.
208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (Equal Rights Amendment)).
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of the Court .3 Although Frontiero had but one dissenter,3' the
four concurring justices declined to recognize sex as a suspect
classification.31
The conflicting standards of scrutiny developed in Reed
and Frontiero have been further complicated by subsequent
ajudication. Although it is generally conceded that Supreme
Court review of sex-discrimination cases has greatly improved
during the seventies,3 3 progress has been slow and uneven. An
examination of the Court's more recent decisions reveals a lack
of consensus on the mode of analysis that should be applied as
well as an absence of a principled basis for determining exactly
what types of governmentally-ordered discrimination are sex-
based. The following discussion highlights the conflicting as-
pects of the Court's post-Frontiero analysis.
Irrebuttable presumptions. Initially, in 1974 and 1975, the
Supreme Court decided two cases involving sex-based classifi-
cations on grounds other than equal protection. In the first,
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,3 the Court struck
down a school board regulation that required teachers to take
mandatory maternity leave for a specified period during the
pregnancy. The Court reasoned that this rule contained an
irrebuttable presumption of physical incapacity, which applied
regardless of an individual woman's ability to continue work-
ing.3 Since the regulation did not provide for an individualized
determination of the teacher's ability to adequately perform
her duties, the Court found this infringed the teacher's right to
procedural due process. The Court also commented that by
penalizing the pregnant teacher, the provisions in question
might influence the decision as to whether to have children,
thereby impinging on the fourteenth amendment due process
30. In contrast to the United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme
Court in Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 485 P.2d 529, 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341
(1971), declared that sex is a suspect classification.
31. Justice Rhenquist, dissenting in Frontiero, agreed with the district court that
administrative efficiency was a valid legislative purpose. 411 U.S. at 69.
32. Justice Stewart stated that the statutes in question worked an invidious
discrimination. Id. at 691. Justice Powell's concurring opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. This opinion stated that since Reed did not
label sex a suspect classification, such expansion should be reserved for the future;
furthermore, since the Equal Rights Amendment was pending in state legislatures, the
Court should not "pre-empt a major political decision." Id. at 692.
33. For one commentator's view, see Johnston-1975, supra note 12.
34. Id. at 235.
35. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
36. Id. at 644.
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rights which guarantee freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life. 7
This irrebuttable presumption doctrine, apparently the
creation of the Burger Court, had been used on occasion before
LaFleur, in one instance to strike down a state statute denying
an unmarried father the right to a hearing on parental fitness
before his children were taken from him.38 Regarded by com-
mentators variously as substantive due process,39 procedural
due process,"° or equal protection" in disguise, the irrebuttable
presumption theory has not been looked upon favorably. Thus
the fact that it has not appeared in the Court's most recent
decisions has been greeted with some relief.'"
A second case which did not mention equal protection was
Taylor v. Louisiana.'3 In Taylor, the Court struck down a state
statute which placed women on petit jury rolls only if they had
taken some positive action to be considered. The Court found
that the challenged statute violated a defendant's sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights to a jury drawn from a cross-
section of the community." Therefore, Taylor appeared to
overrule an earlier decision which had held that a woman's role
as the center of home and family life rendered such legislative
reasoning rational.'5
Equal protection. Turning to equal protection, it seems
clear from Geduldig v. Aiello,"6 that sex-discrimination cases
involve definitional problems: i.e., when is a classification sex-
based? In Geduldig, the Court upheld a California disability
37. Id. at 639-40. The right to privacy in matters of marriage and family life was
firmly recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married persons
have right to birth control and family planning information). The Griswold theory has
been further expounded in later cases. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(right to abortion during first trimester); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right
of unmarried individuals to contraceptives and related information); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry person of one's choice, regardless of race).
38. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
39. E.g., Sewell, Conclusive Presumption and/or Substantive Due Process of
Law, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 151 (1974).
40. E.g., Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions As An Alternative to Strict Scrutiny:
from Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 Ggo. L.J. 1173, 1176 (1974).
41. Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HAv. L. REv. 1534, 1547 (1974); Choper, Forrester, Gunther & Kurkland, Equal Pro-
tection and the Burger Court, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 645 (1975).
42. Johnston-1975, supra note 12, at 261.
43. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
44. Id. at 525.
45. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
46. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
460 [Vol. 18
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plan that exempted from coverage any work loss resulting from
normal pregnancy on the ground that such exclusion was not
sex-based. The Court reasoned that such a plan was merely
removing one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of
compensable disabilities.47 Bolstering its argument that sex-
based discrimination was not at issue, the Court found that the
classification did not even involve men and women; rather, the
two categories were pregnant women and nonpregnant per-
sons.4" Following this premise, it was a simple matter to uphold
the exclusion of normal pregnancy on the theory that the addi-
tion of such a disability to the program's coverage would
greatly increase costs.4"
In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted that gender-linked
disabilities peculiar to men had not been excluded from the
plan and that the state therefore had created a double standard
which constituted sex-based discrimination." In addition, the
Justice called attention to the majority's "apparent retreat"
back to traditional rational relationship analysis."
Although Geduldig has been widely criticized," in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,53 the Court sustained a similar disabil-
ity plan attacked under Title VII.11 The Court considered
Geduldig's equal protection analysis "relevant" in determining
what Congress meant by discrimination. Based on these con-
siderations, the Court held that absent a showing of an invidi-
ous intent to discriminate against one sex or the other,
"lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude
''55pregnancy . . . on any reasonable basis .
47. Id. at 496 n.20.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 496.
50. Id. at 501.
51. Id. at 503.
52. For criticisms of Geduldig see Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The
Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532 (1974); Coleman, Barefoot and Preg-
nant-Still, 16 S. TEX. L.J. 211 (1975); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy
Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 411 (1975).
53. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The program in Geduldig was funded entirely from
employees' wages, whereas in Gilbert, the total compensation package was furnished
by the company. Id. at 129.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970). Title VII prohibits discrimination
upon the basis of sex as well as other grounds.
55. 429 U.S. at 134-35 (emphasis added). Once again dissenting, Mr. Justice
Brennan noted that, in addition to repudiating the applicable guidelines, the Gilbert
holding rejected the unanimous conclusion of all six courts of appeals that had ad-
dressed the question. Id. at 147. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S. Ct. 347 (1977).
Nas4ville Gas represents the latest pronouncement on the pregnancy-employment
1978]
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Secondary sex characteristics. The balance of the post-
Frontiero decisions dealing with sex-based discrimination have
involved discrimination on the basis of non-unique or
"secondary" sex characteristics." Concerning age differentials
based on sex, it appears that the Court has encountered little
difficulty when called upon to strike down these statutes as
being violative of equal protection.
In Stanton v. Stanton,57 the Court overruled a child sup-
port differentiation establishing the age of majority at eighteen
for girls and twenty-one for boys. Reasoning that the distinc-
tion was based on old sexist notions that higher education was
a necessity only for males, the Court held that the statute
constituted an equal protection violation under any test. 8
Though this conclusion is justified, the Court's reasoning cer-
tainly did not contribute to the articulation of a definite stan-
dard to be applied in sex discrimination cases.
The lack of a definite standard problem was partially clari-
fied in another differential case, Craig v. Boren."9 The issue
presented was the validity of an Oklahoma statute prohibiting
the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and
females under the age of eighteen. Faced with the challenge
that the statute impermissibly discriminated against males,
the Court held it violative of equal protection. In so doing, the
Court seemingly applied a middle level of scrutiny: gender-
based classifications were required to serve important govern-
mental objectives and had to be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives. 0 Here, the statistical evidence
benefits issue. The majority, relying on Gilbert, found that an employer's denial of
maternity-leave pay was not per se a violation of Title VII, and remanded the case for
a determination of whether the exclusion of pregnancy was "a mere pretext designed
to effect an invidious discrimination against members of one sex or the other." Id. at
353. The majority also concluded that Nashville Gas' policy of denying employees
returning from pregnancy leave their accumulated seniority acted to "deprive them of
employment opportunities" and "adversely affect their status as an employee" in vio-
lation of Title VII. Id. at 350.
56. The Supreme Court decisions involving pregnancy and employment remain
the only cases dealing with characteristics unique to one sex. Since such attributes
would be excluded from the ERA's mandate of complete sexual neutrality, it remains
a crucial task for the Court to articulate exactly what sorts of discrimination are sex-
based, and what form of equal protection analysis to apply.
57. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
58. Id. at 17.
59. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
60. Id. at 197. In a footnote, the Court mentioned that the traditional rational
relationship test as articulated in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), should be
considered overruled to the extent that it was inconsistent with this holding. 429 U.S.
at 210 n.23.
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as to the incidence of drunken driving among males and fe-
males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one did not
demonstrate a sufficient disparity to justify the discrimination
against males in order to achieve the governmental objective
of traffic safety."'
In his dissent Justice Rehnquist pointed out that this was
the first time that the Court had applied an elevated level of
scrutiny to invalidate a statutory discrimination harmful to
males, except where the statute impaired an important per-
sonal interest protected by the Constitution."2 Since no evi-
dence was presented to support a conclusion that males in this
age group were in any way historically disadvantaged, he
argued, there was no support for the invocation of strict scru-
tiny and the traditional rational relationship test should be the
applicable standard. 3
Apart from the differential treatment setting, the Court
has been slower to abandon the rational relationship test, at
least in ameliorative discrimination cases. In Kahn v. Shevin,14
a 1974 decision, the Court held that a Florida law providing a
property tax exemption for widows but not widowers did not
constitute a violation of equal protection. The basis for this
holding, amply supported by statistical data,65 was the "overt
discrimination . . . of a male-dominated culture, the job mar-
ket [being] . . . inhospitable to the woman seeking any but
the lowest paid jobs ... ."6 Thus, the statute was given no
more than minimal scrutiny and its remedial purpose was con-
sidered rational enough for its continuance.
Although Kahn v. Shevin has frequently been denounced
as a step backwards from the recognition in Frontiero that sex-
based classifications should be viewed with suspicion, 7 the fol-
lowing term, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,"5 the Supreme Court
61. Id. at 200.
62. Id. at 219. To demonstrate when a fundamental interest affecting males
should demand a higher level of scrutiny, Mr. Justice Rehnquist used Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), as an example. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
63. 429 U.S. at 219.
64. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
65. Id. at 353 n.4 & n.5. It is interesting to note that the difference in earnings
between the sexes had increased by six percentage points between 1955 and 1972.
66. Id. at 353.
67. For a forceful critique of Kahn, see B. BABCOCK, supra note 8, at 123-24, where
the authors point out that the dangers of allowing remedial discrimination may very
likely more than outweigh its benefits.
68. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). The Ballard Court was sharply divided, as evidenced by
its 5-4 decision. Id. at 499. The majority opinion in Kahn commanded 6 votes. 416 U.S.
at 351.
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reaffirmed its view that compensatory discrimination favoring
women constituted a valid legislative purpose. The Court re-
jected a challenge to a federal statutory scheme requiring dis-
charge of male military officers passed over twice for promotion
after nine years of service and female officers only after thirteen
years. The Court noted that female line officers had fewer op-
portunities for promotion since they were not assigned to com-
bat and most sea duty. As a result, the Court reasoned that
Congress could quite rationally have believed that the sex-
based differentiation was consistent with the goal of providing
women officers with a fair and equitable career advancement
program. 9 The opinion therefore skirted the whole issue of why
the so-called compensatory legislation was necessary at all. 0
The Court's unwillingness to confront the assumption that
women are unfit for combat strips the holding of its logical
foundation. Also, the decision did nothing to dissipate the con-
fusion regarding remedial discrimination created by Kahn.7
Shortly after Ballard was announced, the Court decided
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,72 wherein a Social Security Act pro-
vision, which paid survivor benefits to the widow of a male
wage-earner but not to the widower following the death of a
deceased female wage-earner, was deemed to violate equal pro-
tection.7" Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court,
found this gender-based distinction indistinguishable from
Frontiero, reasoning that it was unconstitutional to deny
women workers the protection for their families that they had
69. 419 U.S. at 508.
70. Id. However, the Court offered an explanation: "Appellee has not challenged
the current restriction on women officers' participation in combat and most sea duty."
Id.
71. See Johnston-1975, supra note 12, at 236-44, for a discussion of Ballard. In
his article, Professor Johnston states what he feels are the faults of the Ballard ration-
ale. First, he questions whether a less drastic alternative may have been available, and
thereafter inquires into the sufficiency of compensatory discrimination to remedy the
constitutional deficiency of the prohibition against assigning women to combat and sea
duty. However, neither of these crucial factors was dealt with in the opinion. 419 U.S.
at 508.
The validity of benign discrimination in the racial context was successfully chal-
lenged in Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977). If the Supreme Court rules that
ameliorative racial discrimination is constitutionally impermissible, the Kahn-Ballard
rationale will presumably also fall.
72. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
73. Id. at 638-39. Under the existing Social Security provisions, minor children
of either the surviving widow or widower would have been eligible for the benefits. Id.
at 643-44.
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paid for on an equal basis with male wage-earners. Such a
statute, Brennan stated, was based upon the "archaic and
overbroad generalization" that a male worker's earnings are
essential to his family's subsistence whereas his female coun-
terpart's are not. 4
The Court went on to reject the Kahn rationale that the
classification in question was benign-designed to compensate
women beneficiaries for the difficulty they confront when re-
quired to support themselves and their families. 5 Indicating
that a stricter standard than that propounded by the rational
relationship test was called for, the Court stated: "[the] mere
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an auto-
matic shield which protects any inquiry into the actual pur-
poses underlying a statutory scheme.""6
In Califano v. Goldfarb," the Supreme Court's most recent
decision dealing with this subject, a sharply divided Court 8
struck down another Social Security Act provision. This provi-
sion required the widower, but not the widow, to prove actual
dependency in order to qualify for survivor's benefits based
upon the earnings of a deceased spouse." The majority opinion
upheld the district court's conclusion that the statute in ques-
tion constituted an invidious discrimination against female
wage earners by affording them less protection for their surviv-
ing spouses than was provided for male employees. 0 The Court
cited Frontiero and Wiesenfeld as controlling; furthermore, it
stated that the legislative intent was based upon the
"unverified assumption that it would save the Government
time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits to all widows,
rather than to require proof of dependency of both sexes." 8'
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by
three other justices.2 He viewed Kahn as controlling and ex-
plained the sex-based differentiation as "a measure to amelio-
74. Id. at 642-43.
75. Id. at 648.
76. Id.
77. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
78. Goldfarb was a 5-4 decision. The majority opinion, written by Justice Bren-
nan, was joined by only three of the other justices (White, Marshall, and Powell). Id.
at 200.
79. The Social Security Act provision under attack was 42 U.S.C. § 402 (f)(1)(D)
(Supp. V 1975). Id. at 202.
80. Id. at 216-17.
81. Id. at 217.
82. Id. at 224. Mr. Justice Rehnquist was joined in his dissenting opinion by the
Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Blackmun. Id.
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rate the characteristically depressed condition of aged wid-
ows."83 Given this empirically shown condition, Rehnquist
found that "administrative convenience" provided a rational
basis for the statute. 4
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens attempted to rec-
oncile the two different lines of cases cited by the majority and
dissenting opinions. Aware of the inconsistency between Kahn
and Wiesenfeld, Stevens stated that the latter unanimous
holding should be followed rather than the earlier, sharply-
divided ruling.8 Unfortunately, the conflict in the two lines
of reasoning was discussed by only one justice. These incom-
patible precedents make unclear the fate of any statute that
makes a differentiation or amelioration based on sex.
As the foregoing case analysis indicates, the Court has
failed to provide a concrete methodology for identifying and
analyzing claims of ameliorative discrimination.86 Neverthe-
less, it appears certain that statutory distinctions based upon
gender will be given more than minimal scrutiny. Similarly, it
is clear that a majority of the Court will not apply a compelling
interest analysis to these cases. Finally, as evidenced by Craig,
Stanton, Wiesenfeld, and Goldfarb, the Court seems ready to
strike down certain legislation regardless of whether the dis-
criminatory impact is felt by men or women. Conversely, stat-
utes dealing with characteristics unique to one sex, such as the
pregnancy disability in Geduldig, have not received the benefit
of a heightened level of scrutiny.
Therefore, although the Court has displayed an increasing
sensitivity to governmental classifications based upon sex,
several of the more recent cases remain difficult to reconcile.
Whether this situation arises from a failure to articulate a prin-
cipled basis for determining exactly what sorts of discrimina-
tion are sex-based, or a failure to reach a consensus on the
mode of equal protection analysis that should apply, confusion
and uncertainty remain. Due to these factors, it may be that
only with the advent of a constitutional amendment will a truly
adequate basis for the eradication of sex-based discrimination
be realized.
83. Id. at 242.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 224.
86. Johnston-1975, supra note 12, at 260.
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THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
If the long-embattled Equal Rights Amendment 7 is rati-
fied by the requisite number of states,"8 gender-based classifi-
cations will be unconstitutional, and sex will become a prohib-
ited legislative criterion. Since the best that equal rights advo-
cates can expect from equal protection analysis is the classifi-
cation of sex as a suspect criterion, supporters have long urged
that the only truly effective means of eradicating sex-based
discrimination is by means of a constitutional amendment.
The ERA is regarded by its proponents as a measure that,
with two exceptions, would prohibit sex from being used as a
factor in determining the legal rights of men and women.
These two exceptions arise when compelling social interests
override the general premise that all laws must be sex-neutral.
One exception relates to personal privacy; the other concerns
physical characteristics unique to one sex.9
Pursuant to the first exception, the ERA would have to be
applied in a manner consistent with the constitutional guaran-
tee of individual privacy. The scope of the right of privacy in
the area of equal rights would depend upon the mores of the
current community; thus, rules would be ever changing. How-
ever, as a general principle, it can be stated that the right of
privacy would mandate separate but equal facilities for disrob-
ing, sleeping or performing personal bodily functions in the
presence of the other sex.9
The other exception to the amendment concerns statutes
based on physical characteristics unique to one sex. Although
laws dealing with such characteristics are rare, they are gener-
ally founded on strong state interests. Thus, laws punishing
87. The Equal Rights Amendment states:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 24935 (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 271 (1971).
88. Thirty-eight states must ratify the ERA before it becomes law. At the time
of publishing, thirty-five states have done so.
89. See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889
(1971); see also K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-
BASED DISCRIMINATION 108 (1974).
90. S. REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1972).
91. Brown, supra note 89, at 901.
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forcible rape would remain in effect as would, for example,
legislation relating to the determination of fatherhood and
leaves of absence for child bearing.2
Aside from these two rather limited qualifications, the
ERA would prohibit laws from classifying by sex instead of by
the characteristics and abilities of the individual person that
are relevant to the differentiation. This means that the benign
quota approach of Kahn and Ballard would not be allowed. 3
Similarly, "separate but equal" facilities would not be permit-
ted unless they fit into one of the previously mentioned excep-
tions or did not arouse public concern. 4
Much of the ERA's application would be obvious and
direct. The outcome of cases previously discussed dealing with
jury law exemptions, 5 the right of women to enter certain occu-
pations and professions"6 or act as trustees or executors, 7 age
differentials," and government benefit programs99 would all
require the abolition of any double standard. In this regard, the
amendment would have a uniform and far reaching effect, lim-
ited only by the requirement of state action. °0
Concerning this requirement, a problem arises in deter-
mining what should be viewed as part of the public sector. In
this sector, differing treatment on account of sex would be
impermissible, while such treatment would be constitutional in
the private sector.'"' Generally, facilities which affect the pub-
lic concern or are financed by a federal or state government
would be subject to the mandate of the ERA. Depending upon
92. Id. at 894.
93. See notes 64-71 and accompanying text supra.
94. Brown, supra note 89, at 909.
95. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961); notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1873); notes 3-5, 9 and accompanying text supra.
97. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); notes 16-22 and accompanying text
supra.
98. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); notes 56-63 and accompanying text supra.
99. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); notes 23-32, 64-66, 72-85 and accompanying text supra.
100. Brown, supra note 89, at 905. In this article, the authors list two concepts
of state action: (1) the existence of state action depends upon the nature and degree
of state involvement; (2) state action depends upon the function being performed.
From these two concepts, the authors conclude that "state action" takes place in the
public sector of society and not in the private sector. Id.
101. Id. at 906.
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the nature of the activity involved, however, separation of the
sexes in the private sector would not be foreclosed.' °2
The amendment's potential impact in three areas has
dominated the literature pro and con: protective labor legisla-
tion, family support laws, and military service. 0 With respect
to labor legislation, the courts' and agencies' interpretation of
Title VII and its various state analogies have largely dulled the
impact the proposed constitutional amendment would have in
the area.'"4 For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has already taken the position that many laws
originally promulgated for the purpose of protecting women are
in conflict with Title VII. The Commission views these laws as
discriminatory because they do not take into account an indi-
vidual female's capacities and preferences.'"' Despite these
views, the ERA could still be used to fill any gaps left by
existing legislation.
Since protective labor legislation would have to be reconsi-
dered in light of the ERA, state laws, like the one discussed in
LaFleur, '"I providing for compulsory maternity leaves would
merit attention. Although it could be argued that these laws
and regulations deal with unique physical characteristics of
women, such statutes would require careful judicial review.
The regulation would fail if the state could not show the exist-
102. Id. at 903.
103. K. DAVIDSON, supra note 89, at 109-10; see generally Brown, supra note 89,
at 922-78.
104. K. DAVIDSON, supra note 89, at 109. See, e.g., Freund, The Equal Rights
Amendment is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 234, 242 (1971). Labor groups
have often opposed the Amendment because it was thought that the Amendment
would deprive working women of important gains achieved only after hard-fought
battles in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Brown, supra note 89, at
922.
It is also noteworthy that Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification is an
exception to the statute's absolute prohibition against sex-based classifications in
much the same way as the ERA's exception for unique physical characteristics. Id. at
926.
105. See EEOC Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(2) (1970) (issued Aug. 19,
1969). It has been noted that the EEOC position is consistent with the view of ERA
proponents, which was first explained in the 1920's and reiterated in virtually all
discussions in support of the amendment since then. Laws setting health and safety
standards "should be enacted for all workers .... Legislation that includes women
but exempts men . . . limits the woman worker's scope of activity . . . by barring her
from economic opportunity. Moreover, restrictive conditions [for women but not for
men] fortifies the harmful assumption that labor for pay is primarily the prerogative
of the male." K. DAVIDSON, supra note 89, at 109.
106. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). See notes 35-37 and
accompanying text supra.
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ence of a "problem" of legitimate legislative concern and suffi-
ciently close relationship between the problem and the physi-
cal characteristics in question.'07
Under the ERA, compulsory maternity leave regulations
would be invalidated for two reasons. First, pregnancy is sim-
ply one of a large number of temporary disabilities. Thus, it
could not validly be singled out for separate constitutional
treatment. Second, even if maternity leave in general is based
on a compelling state interest, the imposition of compulsory
leave would be impermissible. A rule letting a woman and her
doctor decide if optional leave is necessary would clearly be a
less onerous alternative solution. In other words, a LaFleur
type regulation discriminatorily singles out a small sex-linked
category of a larger field of temporary disabilities and imposes
a more drastic solution than is necessary.' 8
If the singling out of pregnancy can be regarded as discrim-
inatory, the Court's holdings in Geduldig and Gilbert, dealing
with disability benefit programs that exclude normal preg-
nancy from coverage, would be overturned unless the propo-
nents of such programs could meet the almost insurmountable
burden of proving that the total exclusion of this sex-based
disability was the least drastic alternative available to them.
A second source of controversy surrounding passage of the
ERA deals with domestic relations law, and family support
laws in particular. The only restriction which the ERA would
put on legislatures would be the requirement that laws be
drafted in sex-neutral terms. Since the modern trend has been
toward the elimination of all differentiations based on sex, 00
the only effect of the ERA would be to move the law along more
quickly in the direction in which it is already going." 0
The question of the status of women in relation to the
military has probably generated more controversy than any
other issue surrounding ratification of the ERA."' As currently
107. See Brown, supra note 89, at 930-32.
108. Id. at 932; Schattmen v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1972), rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
109. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT (Final Draft, 1970). See K.
DAVIDSON, supra note 89, at 109. See also Brown, supra note 89, at 937.
110. Brown, supra note 89, at 937. The authors of this article astutely observe
that in the area of domestic relations law, social customs, economic realities and
individual preferences have a far greater influence on behavior than the law. Id. at 937-
38.
111. See Hale & Kanowitz, Woman and the Draft, 23 HAST. L.J. 199 (1971). See
also Brown, supra note 89, at 967-79.
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proposed, the ERA would subject women to the Selective Serv-
ice Act; everyone would be eligible for the draft and would be
subject to the same set of rules for exemptions and defer-
ments." Whether women would be suitable for combat duty
would be decided on the basis of individual capacity rather
than sex. All standards of physical and mental fitness would
have to be equal.
Termination of the draft has redirected some of the discus-
sion toward marked differentials between servicemen and
women in enlistment standards, fringe benefits, and vocational
training opportunities. "3 After having to meet higher standards
to enter the service, women have received fewer vocational
training opportunities and fringe benefits. Ratification of the
amendment would require equalization of all of the above fac-
tors." 4
It has been rightfully argued that the only effective means
of abolishing sex-based discrimination in the laws of this coun-
try would be by passage of a constitutional amendment. Al-
though the judicial trend in the past several years has been
toward the eradication of laws which classify on the basis of
sex, the equal protection guarantee was not framed to serve this
purpose and can contribute only slowly and partially to the
cause for equal rights. Likewise, the process of piecemeal legis-
lation could provide only a long and uncertain alternative. In
contrast, the ERA would provide an emphatic statement that
this nation is committed to the proposition that men and
women are equal before the law, and that everyone, regardless
of sex, is entitled to enjoy the full range of constitutional guar-
antees.
As noted at the outset, individuals interested in women's
rights need to become aware of the international remedies
112. Although the Equal Rights Amendment as it now stands contains no excep-
tions for the military, it has been proposed that the draft be exempted. See Brown,
supra note 89, at 969 n.255.
113. K. DAMDSON, supra note 89, at 110. For a comprehensive review of this topic,
see Note, The E.R.A. and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533 (1973).
114. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), has already begun to compel
equalization of federal military benefits. See notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra.
An interesting side issue was recently presented in Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415
F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976), where the court ruled that a Massachusetts veterans'
preference statute unconstitutionally discriminated against women. The equal protec-
tion violation was based on the fact that the statute resulted in an "absolute and
permanent preference in the area of public employment to veterans at the expense of
women," and that less drastic alternatives to reward veterans were available. Id. at
487.
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available to aid in the struggle for equality. Thus, an examina-
tion of the relevant treaties and conventions is necessary to
complement the discussion of the constitutional remedies.
WOMEN'S RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Existing Conventions
General human rights agreements. There are several inter-
national agreements in force which broadly proclaim the equal-
ity of all persons. The most widely known of these is the United
Nations Charter, which is the fundamental source for all inter-
national human rights obligations."' The Charter's preamble
makes specific mention of the "equal rights of men and
women," putting this principle on the same high level of con-
cern as fundamental human rights and the dignity of the
human person. The purposes of the United Nations as set forth
in Article 1, are to promote and encourage respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms regardless of race, sex,
language or religion."'
In Chapter IX of the Charter, dealing with international
economic and social cooperation, Article l's general principle
of nondiscrimination is reiterated in Article 55(c). In addition,
Article 56 states that "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to
take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organi-
zation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55."17 Action is likewise called for in Article 13, which directs
the General Assembly to "initiate studies and make recom-
mendations for the purpose of (b) . . . assisting in the realiza-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.""'
Whereas these and other provisions of the Charter are
quite broad and general in scope, Article 8 accords women a
specific right-ensuring sexual equality in the hiring practices
115. The United States ratified the Charter on Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945).
116. U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (emphasis added). Chapter XII, dealing with the Inter-
national Trusteeship System, reiterates the principles stated in art. 1. See also id. art.
62(2) (functions and powers of the Economic and Social Council).
117. The extent to which art. 55 imposes an affirmative obligation on U.N.
members has been the subject of considerable divergence of opinion. See Hudson,
Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 543 (1950);
Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-the Fujii Case, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 62(1951); Note, Human Rights and Freedoms Provisions of the United Nations Charter,
3 ALA. L. REv. 158 (1950); Note, U.N. Charter Invalidates Alien Land Law, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 797 (1950).
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 13 (emphasis added).
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of the United Nations' principal and subsidiary organs. '
Another United Nations document, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights,' 0 adopted by a unanimous General As-
sembly resolution, can be analogized to the Constitution's Bill
of Rights. It sets forth the fundamental rights to which all
individuals are entitled.'21 The preamble of the Universal Dec-
laration calls to attention the principle of equality as stated in
the preamble of the United Nations Charter; 2 furthermore,
Article 2 pronounces the general norm of nondiscrimination,'23
which is reinforced by the equal protection provision of Article
7.124
119. Id. art. 8 states: "The United Nations shall place no restriction on the
eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and knder conditions of
equality in its principal and subsidiary organs."
It should be noted that the article's mandate for nondiscrimination has not been
evidenced in U.N. practices. For whatever reason, statistics bear out that women are
in a distinct minority as U.N. employees, and that the higher the position, the less
likely it is that a woman holds it. See Ginsburg, Introduction to Symposium: The
Status of Women, 20 AM. J. CoMP. L. 585, 586 (1972).
In an effort to bring practice more in line with principle, in December, 1975, the
General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to increase the
number of women in professional posts. U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Jan., 1976, at 63.
120. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal
Declaration].
121. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights differs from the United States
Bill of Rights in that the latter includes only civil and political rights whereas the
former also includes economic, social, and cultural rights. See note 133 and accom-
panying text infra.
This declaration has provided the basis for many of the studies and recommenda-
tions later made by the U.N. Comm'n on the Status of Women. See generally Bruce,
Work of the United Nations Relating to the Status of Women, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 365,
369-70 (1971).
122. The Universal Declaration expressly reminds "the peoples of the United
Nations" that they had "reaffirmed their faith in . . . the equal rights of men and
women" by signing the U.N. Charter. Universal Declaration, supra note 120, at 72.
123. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the politi-
cal, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to
which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Id. art. 2, at 72 (emphasis added).
This article has provided a model for other human rights conventions, such as the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Article 14 of the European
Convention stipulates the same classifications for non-discrimination except that it
substitutes "association with a national minority" for Paragraph 2 of Art. 2 of the
Universal Declaration. Id. at 232.
124. Article 7 provides:
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Article 16 of the Universal Declaration, dealing with mar-
riage, refers specifically to "men and women" as opposed to
"everyone."' 25 Article 16 was drafted with the intention of con-
demning national family laws which discriminate on the basis
of sex as well as national laws or customs which allow a girl to
be given away in marriage before she reaches a proper age or
without her consent.
In addition to the United Nations activity, two other broad
human rights treaties deserve mention: The International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (Political Covenant)"' and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Cultural Covenant).17
The Political Covenant encompasses most of the rights
contained in the United States Bill of Rights, but extends well
beyond them. Several of its provisions concern women's rights.
For example: Article 2(1) provides a broad claim barring dis-
crimination based on sex, among other grounds;' Article 3
requires states who are parties to the covenant to "undertake
to ensure the equal right of men or women to the enjoyment of
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against
any incitement to such discrimination.
Universal Declaration, supra note 120, art. 7, at 73.
125. Article 16 states:
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at
its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent
of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Id. art. 16, at 74.
126. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Political
Covenant]. See generally Guggenheim & Defeis, United States Participation in Inter-
national Agreements Providing Rights for Women, 10 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Guggenheim]. The treaty entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976
when 35 ratifications had been recorded.
127. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 [here-
inafter cited as Cultural Covenant].
128. Article 2(1) states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Political Covenant, supra note 126, at 53 (emphasis added).
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all civil and political rights set forth in [the treaty]"; and
Article 26 requires states to provide effective protection against
any discrimination.'
In addition to its general concern with sex-based discrimi-
nation, the Political Covenant also guarantees women certain
specific rights, including the right to take part in the conduct
of all public affairs, to vote and stand for election, and to have
access to public services.'30 It also requires states "to insure
equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage,
during marriage and at dissolution."' 3 '
The Cultural Covenant guarantees women the same basic
rights in the economic, social, and cultural spheres as the Polit-
ical Covenant does in the civil and political arenas.'32 Since the
United States Bill of Rights predated the recognition of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights,' 33 the rights stipulated in this
covenant have no counterpart in the American constitution.
However, several of these guarantees have been dealt with by
means of legislation,' 34 though they are not considered funda-
mental constitutional rights in this country.'30
129. Article 26 provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or so-
cial origin, property, birth or other status.
Id. at 55-56 (emphasis added).
130. Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 4.
131. Id.
132. Economic rights include the right to work, Cultural Covenant, supra note
127, art. 6, at 50; the right to just and favorable conditions of work., id. art. 7; and the
right to social security, id. art. 9. Social rights include the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living, id. art. 11; the right to the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health, id. art. 12; and the right of everyone to an education, id.
art. 13, at 51. Cultural rights include the right of everyone to take part in the cultural
life, to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application, and to benefit from
any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he is the author. Id. art. 15.
133. In the western political tradition, the recognition of economic, social and
cultural rights is a distinctively twentieth century concept; thus they were never con-
sidered by the framers of the United States Constitution in the eighteenth century.
However, certain twentieth century constitutions such as those of Mexico (1903) and
the U.S.S.R. (1917) include these rights. Also, African states coming into existence
after 1948 have sometimes incorporated provisions of the Universal Declaration into
their constitutions.
134. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Supp. V 1975); Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (Supp. V 1975).
135. The United States Supreme Court has expressly repudiated the idea that
the right to education or the right to welfare is a fundamental interest requiring the
strict scrutiny approach in equal protection cases. San Antonio Independent School
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
Parties to this convention recognize the right to work, the
right to just and favorable conditions of work, the right to social
security, the right of everyone to an adequate standard of liv-
ing, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health, the right of everyone to an education, and the
right of all to take part in cultural life, enjoying the benefits of
scientific progress and its application, and to benefit from one's
own scientific, literary, or artistic production. 36 Rights dealing
with marriage and the family, employment, public health and
education are also enumerated.'37
Two provisions are especially significant in the area of
women's rights. Article 3 requires states to "undertake to en-
sure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all
economic, social and cultural rights set forth. . . in the Cove-
nant"; likewise, Article 2 guarantees that the rights will be
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to sex. Another
provision assures equal remuneration for work of equal value,
as well as guarantees sexual equality in working conditions."8
Both the Political and Cultural Covenants were adopted
by resolution of the General Assembly in 1966. Having received
the necessary number of ratifications,'39 the first-mentioned
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (right to education); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970) (right to welfare).
136. Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 6.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Article 7 states:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work which
ensure, in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum,
with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by
men, with equal pay for equal work;
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employ-
ment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations
other than those of seniority and competence;
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours
and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public
holidays.
Cultural Covenant, supra note 127, at 50.
139. Thirty-five states were required to ratify these agreements before they came
into force. Political Covenant, supra note 126, art. 27, at 58; Cultural Covenant, supra
note 127, art. 27, at 52.
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covenant came into force in 1976; the second in 1975. Since
these agreements are fairly new, it is difficult to project exactly
how much effect they will have on the rights of women in the
ratifying countries, a group of nations in which the United
States is not included.
Conventions dealing specifically with the rights of women.
In addition to the aforementioned treaties dealing with the
rights of all individuals, several conventions are in force which
deal specifically with the rights of women." '
The Convention on the Political Rights of Women was
adopted by the General Assembly in 1952, and came into force
two years later."' This treaty has been signed by the majority
of members of the United Nations, and finally, by the United
States as well."' The Convention reflects the belief that "the
achievement of full status for women as citizens was the key
to acceptance of women as equal participants in the life of the
community.""' Additionally, it provides that women shall be
entitled, on equal terms with men, to vote in all elections;" 4 to
be eligible for election to all publicly-elected bodies established
by national laws;" 5 and to hold public office and to exercise all
public functions established by national law.14
A second significant convention was adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1957. The Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women," 7 sought to "eliminate the automatic effect
on the nationality of the wife of marriage, its dissolution, or the
change of nationality by the husband" and to "provide a satis-
140. For a general overview of conventions dealing with women's rights, see
COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND NATIONAL
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE STATUS OF WOMEN, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/552 (1972).
141. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, entered into force July 7,
1954, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as Political Rights Convention]. The Con-
vention was drafted by the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women
(Commission). For a study of the Commission's work, see Bruce, supra note 121;
Guggenheim, The Implementation of Human Rights by the U.N. Commission on the
Status of Women: A Brief Comment, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 239 (1977).
142. The United States ratified the treaty on July 7, 1976. See generally, note
204 infra.
143. UNITED NATIONS, THE CONVENTION ON THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN: HIS-
TORY AND COMMENTARY 1, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/27 (1955).
144. Political Rights Convention, supra note 141, art. I, at 136.
145. Id. art. II, at 138.
146. Id. art. III, at 138. One commentator noted that this article presented the
greatest difficulties in the preparatory work of drafting the convention. Moreover,
several states have made reservations to it on ratifying the Convention. Bruce, supra
note 121, at 371, 372 n.8.
147. The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, entered into force
Aug. 11, 1958, 309 U.N.T.S. 65 (1957).
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factory solution to the conflicts of law regarding the effect of
marriageon the nationality of the wife." '' 48
Up to the end of the last century, it had generally been
accepted that, when a woman married, she would give up her
own nationality, and assume that of her husband.'4  However,
it came to be recognized that this could result in the woman
losing important personal rights or placing her in the dangerous
position of becoming stateless as a result of marriage.'58 The
principal thrust of the Convention was directed at these prob-
lems. Thus, its first article provides: "Neither the celebration
nor the dissolution of a marriage between one of its nationals
and an alien, nor the change of nationality by the husband
during marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of
the wife." Similarly, its second article states: "Neither the vol-
untary acquisition of the nationality of another state nor the
renunication of its nationality by one of its nationals shall pre-
vent the retention of its nationality by the wife of such na-
tional." Finally, its third article gives the woman the option of
selecting her husband's nationality through "specially privi-
leged naturalization procedures."
In 1962, the General Assembly adopted another conven-
tion dealing with marriage. The Convention on Consent to
Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Regi.stration of
Marriages,'"' had its origin in studies made by the United Na-
tions Commission on the Status of Women as well as a recom-
mendation adopted in 1956 by a conference to abolish slav-
ery. 1 2 This Convention requires the participating states to pro-
vide for consensual marriages,' a specific minumum age for
marriage,IH and the registration of all marriages in an appropri-
ate official register by a competent authority.'55
148. UNITED NATIONS, CONVENTIONS ON THE NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND COMMENTARY 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/389 (1962).
149. This automatic change of nationality on the part of the woman was based
on two traditional principles: that the husband was the head of the family, and that
there should be unity of nationality of the family. Bruce, supra note 121, at 373.
150. Id. at 373-74.
151. Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Regis-
tration of Marriages, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter
cited as Convention on Marriage] (entered into force Dec. 9, 1974).
152. See Bruce, supra note 121, at 375. This conference was convened to prepare
the supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Insti-
tutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. Id.
153. Convention on Marriage, supra note 151, art. I, at 234.
154. Id. art. 2.
155. Id. art. 3.
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As a complement to the convention dealing with social and
political rights, there are a number of existing conventions
dealing with the economic rights of women,'50 which have been
promulgated by the International Labor Organization (ILO). 1'57
These conventions center on the rights set forth in Article 23
of the Universal Declaration, 5 ' and are of two main types:
"promotional" conventions, aimed primarily at overcoming
economic and social discrimination against women in the world
of work; and "protective," which seek to provide women with
special protection which it is felt they require because of their
biological function of maternity and motherhood. 5'
There are three promotional-type conventions worthy of
mention. The oldest of the three, the Convention Concerning
Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of
Equal Value,"' adopted by the ILO in 1951, requires members
to ensure the application of the principle embodied in its
title."'
Seven years later, the ILO adopted the Convention Con-
cerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occu-
pation."' It prohibits "any distinction, exclusion or preference"
156. For a survey of the adoption of laws prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of sex, see Note, The Rights of Working Women: An International
Perspective, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 729 (1974). The author concludes that in most countries,
practice has fallen short of legal promise. Id. at 729, 733.
157. The ILO was established in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles and is now the
specialized agency of the United Nations concerned with employment. For a detailed
study of the history of the ILO, see A. ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE ILO (1971), cited in
Guggenheim, supra note 126 at 9, 10 & n.73.
158. Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states:
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just
and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemploy-
ment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for
equal work.
Universal Declaration, supra note 120, art. 23, at 75.
159. Bruce, supra note 121, at 378.
160. Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers
for Work of Equal Value, adopted June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force
May 23, 1953).
161. Article 2 of the Convention states:
1. Each Member shall, by means appropriate to the methods in opera-
tion for determining rates of remuneration, promote and, in so far as is
consistent with such methods, ensure the application to all workers of the
principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of
equal value.
Id. art. 2, at 306.
162. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Oc-
cupation, adopted June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 32 (entered into force June 15, 1960).
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on account of sex that "has the effect of nullifying or impairing
equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupa-
tion.""' The Convention mandates that both national policy
and legislation must be brought into line with this principle.' 4
Under the provisions of this Convention, however, protective
legislation promulgated by the ILO is not deemed to be dis-
criminatory."5
More recently, the ILO adopted the Convention Concern-
ing Employment Policy,' which requires each member to
"declare and pursue, as a major goal, an active policy designed
to promote full, productive and freely chosen employment."', 7
Its basic theme is that workers should qualify for employment
on the basis of their "skills and endowments . . . irrespective
of. . . sex.""'
Other ILO conventions, whose purpose is to protect women
from harsh working conditions, are narrower in scope. Exam-
ples of such agreements are the Convention Concerning Night
Work of Women Employed in Industry"'9 and the Convention
Concerning Employment of Women on Underground Work in
Mines of all Kinds.'70 The first convention prohibits the em-
ployment of women, with a few exceptions, 7' from working at
night. The second generally prevents women from working in
underground mines.'
As discussed previously, this type of protective labor legis-
163. Id. art. l(1)(a), at 32-33.
164. Id. arts. 2, 3, at 34.
165. Id. art. 5, at 36.
166. Convention Concerning Employment Policy, adopted July 9, 1964, 569
U.N.T.S. 65 (entered into force July 15, 1966).
167. Id. art. 1, at 68.
168. Id. See generally Guggenheim, supra note 126.
169. Convention Concerning Night Work of Women Employed in Industry,
adopted July 9, 1948, 81 U.N.T.S. 147 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1951) [hereinafter
cited as Night Work Convention].
170. Convention Concerning the Employment of Women on Underground Work
in Mines of All Kinds, adopted June 21, 1935, 40 U.N.T.S. 63 (entered into force May
30, 1937) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Underground Work in Mines].
171. Under the Night Work Convention, supra note 169, women of all ages are
prohibited from working at night except in a family undertaking, id. art. 3, at 150, for
a force majeure, id. art. 4, a serious national emergency, id. art. 5, or where the work
is "necessary to preserve 'rapidly deteriorating' materials from certain loss." Id. art.
4; Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 12-14.
172. The Convention Concerning the Employment of Women on Underground
Work makes exceptions for women in training, in health and welfare services, in man-
agement, and for others who may occasionally enter nonmanual work. Convention on
Underground Work in Mines, supra note 170, art. 3, at 64-66.
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lation has recently come under attack in the United States.'
It is viewed as being more discriminatory than protective.
Other nations are also closely scrutinizing this type of legisla-
tion.17' The necessity of this legislation is a legitimate subject
of inquiry in light of the changing conditions in modern indus-
try or in terms of evaluating workers on the basis of ability, not
gender.'75
One plausible reason for such national and ILO legislation
is the United Nations Convention Concerning Maternity Pro-
tection, that entered into force in 1955.176 The Maternity Con-
vention was designed to protect the maternal function of
women by providing for maternity leave before and after con-
finement. "' Despite its admittedly special purpose, it could
serve as a detriment to women in two ways: first, employers
may be reluctant to hire women of childbearing age as they
may become obligated to grant the maternity leave and pay the
prescribed benefits; and second, such a law requiring a compul-
sory leave does not take into account the situation of the indi-
vidual woman, who may, for a number of reasons, neither de-
sire nor need the leave. 179
The positive factor in the Maternity Convention is that
pregnancy is treated like any other temporary disability. 7 ' In
any event, the area of protective labor legislation presents
highly controversial issues that involve difficult policy deci-
173. See note 105 and accompanying text supra. Protective laws have been con-
demned as placing restrictions on women in two ways: (1) they absolutely bar women
from certain types of work and (2) they may cause employers not to hire women for
other types of work because of the special conditions imposed by the employer hiring
women. Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 15.
174. See generally Note, supra note 156, at 730, 746.
175. Bruce, supra note 121, at 380. If there exists a need to protect workers from,
for example, underground mines, that protection should be accorded to all workers,
both male and female.
176. Convention Concerning Maternity Protection, adopted June 28, 1952, 214
U.N.T.S. 321 (entered into force Sept. 7, 1955).
177. Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 15 (citing Convention Concerning Matern-
ity Protection, supra note 176, arts. 3-6, at 326-28).
178. It is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court in Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), struck down a mandatory maternity leave for
teachers. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
In LaFleur, the Court struck down the provision as creating an irrebuttable pre-
sumption-i. e., the teachers were not permitted to demonstrate that they were capable
of continuing work. This argument is equally applicable to the Maternity Convention.
179. This view has also been adhered to by the EEOC, but as noted previously
in notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra, the United States Supreme Court in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), did not consider the EEOC's guide-
lines to be binding and therefore felt at liberty to reach a contrary conclusion.
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sions. A satisfactory resolution cannot be expected until
women, even when pregnant, are viewed as individuals, with
individual needs and abilities, and until significant changes are
made in the nature of employment and family services.'
A final area where women have received special attention
is in the area of education. The Convention Against Discrimi-
nation in Education was adopted by the United Nations Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization8' in accordance with Article 26
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and guarantees
the right to an education.' 2 Under this convention, "separate
but equal" institutions for members of different sexes are al-
lowed, providing the institutions are of the same quality. 8 3
Following the model set forth in the Universal Declaration, the
convention requires states to provide free and compulsory pri-
mary education, and to make education above this level avail-
able and accessible to all.' 4 The convention came into force in
1962, and has been ratified by a great number of states, al-
though once again, the United States is not among them.
180. One commentator lists "problems of working women with family responsi-
bilities [that] are indeed difficult," calling for such measures as:
family services, appropriate child-care institutions in both urban and
rural areas; general reduction of working hours and more rational organi-
zation of the working day; part-time work, if desired, with adequate
safeguards to ensure that the conditions of employment are of the same
standard as those for full-time workers; and the recognition of mother-
hood as a social function and, as such, entitled to protection by the State,
employers, trade unions, and society as a whole.
Bruce, supra note 121, at 381.
181. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 14, 1962,
429 U.N.T.S. 93. For a review of the Convention and the right to education in general,
see Shelton, Women and the Right to Education, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 51 (1975).
182. Art. 26 of the Universal Declaration, states:
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all
on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full developments of the
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance
and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3. Parents have the right to choose the kind of education that shall
be given to their children.
Universal Declaration, supra note 120, art. 26, at 76.
183. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 181, art. 2, at
96-98; see generally Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 8-9.
184. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 181, art. 4, at
98-100.
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Future Conventions
The Draft Convention. The Draft Convention on the Elim-
ination of Discrimination Against Women (Draft Conven-
tion)"8 5 is the international counterpart to the ERA. Both are
intended to supplement and fill in the gaps left by dealing with
sex-based discrimination on an issue-by-issue basis, and both
would act as a single comprehensive statement that discrimi-
nation against women is "incompatible with human dign-
ity ."'8
The Draft Convention was recently completed by the
Commission on the Status of Women (Commission) and has
been submitted to the General Assembly, which is expected to
take up consideration of the convention as a matter of urgency
during its present session.8 7 If the General Assembly adopts the
Draft Convention, it will be open for ratification by the mem-
ber states, and will hopefully enter into force in the near future.
The Draft Convention had its beginning in the Declaration
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, which
was initiated by the General Assembly and unanimously
adopted by 111 states in 1967.188 Although a declaration does
not carry the binding effect of a ratified convention, this decla-
ration received such an overwhelming vote of support that it is
thought to carry great moral force and, according to some
views, legal force as well.8 9
The Declaration's preamble refers to the equal rights pro-
visions of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, and states that sex-based discrimina-
185. For the text of the Convention, see COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
REPORT ON THE 25TH SESSION (1974), 56 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4) 32, U.N. Doc.
E/5451 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 REPORT], see U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/591 (1976)
for examples of comments from member states.
186. This principle is stated in the preambles of both the United Nations Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
187. See 62 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), U.N. Doc. E/5909 (1977). In accord-
ance with U.N. procedure, upon completion of the Draft Convention, the Commission
on the Status of Women forwarded the document to the Economic and Social Council,
which readily approved it and forwarded it to the General Assembly for adoption. See
62 U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/RES/2058 (1977).
188. See Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Res. 2263, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 35, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Declaration on Discrimination]. Work began in 1963 when the General Assem-
bly noted in a resolution that there still remained considerable discrimination against
women, in fact if not in law, and asked the Comm'n on the Status of Women to prepare
a draft to eliminate it. Introductory Statement of the U.N. Office of Public Informa-
tion, OPI/297-05287-April 1968-50M.
189. Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 21-22.
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tion "is an obstacle to the full development of the potentialities
of women in the service of their countries and humanity." The
first article sets forth the Declaration's underlying premise:
"[d]iscrimination against women . . . is fundamentally un-just and constitutes an offence against human dignity." The
second article calls for the abolition of national laws, customs,
regulations, and practices which discriminate against women,
and calls for the ratification of international instruments which
work toward this purpose.' 0
Several following articles then set out the civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights of women,' 9 ' which have
been stated in previous conventions and which are for the most
part reiterated in the Draft Convention. The final article urges
implementation of the principles set forth in the Declaration
by all individuals, governments, and nongovernmental organi-
zations.'
The Draft Convention represents the Commission's deci-
sion to denounce sex-based discrimination in a single conven-
tion.'93 Copies of the draft were forwarded to member govern-
ments, who in turn sent their comments to the Commission.
Though these recommendations were accorded considerable
weight, it appears that the final form of the Convention does
not vary greatly from the version originally conceived by the
Commission.' 94
The Draft Convention's scope also reflects the Commis-
sion's view that only the fundamental aspects of women's
rights should be covered, avoiding the more detailed provisions
already embodied in existing conventions.'95 Thus, Article 1(1)
provides a broad proscription against all sex-based discrimina-
tion.'99 In line with this view, discrimination is outlawed in
190. Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 188, art. 2, at 36.
191. The enumerated rights include: the right to vote, hold public office and
exercise all public funcions (art. 4); the right to maintain one's nationality upon
marriage (art. 5); the right to property and equality of legal capacity, as well as the
equal status of husband and wife (art. 6); the right to equal treatment under national
penal codes (art. 7); right to equality in education (art. 9); the right to equality in
economic and social life, as well as the right to have the proper services provided in
the event of maternity (art. 10). Id. at 36-38.
192. Id. art. 11, at 37.
193. 1974 REPORT, supra note 185, at 31.
194. See McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Human Rights for Women and World
Public Order: The Outlawing of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 497, 517-
18 (1975).
195. Id. at 518.
196. Article 1 of the Convention, which was evidently derived from the Conven-
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several crucial areas where women have traditionally lacked an
equal footing with men.'97 Similarly, parties to the Convention
must initiate reforms to eliminate sex-based discrimination in
all its forms' 8 and work toward the education of public opinion
in an effort to eliminate prejudice.' 9
In keeping with the general premise that sex discrimina-
tion must be eradicated, a General Assembly resolution pro-
claimed the year 1975 "International Women's Year." 00 A
World Conference took place in Mexico City from June 19 to
July 2 of that year, at which the years 1976 through 1985 were
designated the "United Nations Decade for Women and Devel-
opment."20 ' The themes of this decade are equality, develop-
ment and peace, and as with the Draft Convention, all individ-
uals, governments and organizations have been urged to act
jointly and separately, within their particular spheres of inter-
est, to implement the principle of sexual equality.
Foreign Conventions-The Argument for Ratification
It is indeed curious that the United States, which purports
to place great value upon the guarantees provided by its own
Constitution, and which advocates the democratic system as a
tion on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, adopted Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 states:
In this Convention, the term "discrimination against women" shall mean
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which
has the effect of or the purpose of nullifying the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any field of public life.
1974 REPORT, supra note 185, art. 1, at 34.
197. Article 8 of the Draft Convention insures the right to equal opportunity to
participate in the political and public life of the country. This includes the right to
hold public office and participate in the formulation of government policy, as well as
nongovernmental organizations and associations. Id. art. 8, at 36-37.
Economic rights include the right to equal employment opportunity as well as
equal remuneration and vocational training. Id. art. 11, at 38-39.
Equal educational opportunity also encompasses equal opportunity to benefit
from scholarships and continuing education programs, as well as access to information
"to help in insuring the health and well-being of families." Id. art. 10, at 37-38.
Article 15 requires that women receive equality before the law. Id. art. 15, at 41.
Article 16 requires that marriage be an institution consisting of two partners with
equal rights. It also embodies the principle of consent. Id. art. 16, at 42. In addition,
the Draft Convention asserts that "the protection of motherhood is a common interest
of the entire society which should bear the responsibilities for it." Id. art. 5(1), at 36.
198. Id. art. 2, at 34-35.
199. Id. art. 5, at 36.
200. G.A. Res. 3010, 27 GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 67, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
201. REPORT OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR,
U.N. Doc. E/CONF.66/34 (1976).
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model for other countries, has for so long refused to ratify
human rights conventions. Of the foregoing conventions extol-
ling equal rights, the United States is a party to only the
United Nations Charter, the International Agreement for the
Suppression of White Slave Traffic and, most recently, the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women.' 2 Although op-
ponents of ratification have used a number of arguments to
conclude that the United States lacks constitutional power to
accede to these treaties, 03 it appears that the impediment is
based on policy rather than law.
Fortunately, there are evidences of a reversal in this trend.
The ratification of the Political Rights Convention, although it
does not provide any new rights,' 4 is one indication; another is
the increased emphasis that the Carter administration is plac-
ing on human rights in the formulation of its foreign policy.
Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women and other human rights conventions
would serve the dual purpose of aiding in the struggle to abolish
sex-based discrimination as well as improving the American
image abroad.0 5
Due to the uncertainty of the Supreme Court's stance on
women's rights, and recalling that treaties carry the force of
federal legislation,0 ' the signing of these conventions would
place equal rights advocates on a sounder footing. Addition-
ally, conventions such as the ones dealing with the political
rights of women and equal remuneration for work of equal
202. Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 1, 22.
203. See Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 23-41. The authors discuss the three
main arguments that opponents of United States ratification of international conven-
tions have employed: (1) that these treaties involve matters within the domestic juris-
diction of the United States; (2) that they involve the reserved powers of the states;
and (3) that they are not of international concern. The authors convincingly rebut all
of these rationales and then conclude with a quote from a study by the President's
Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year, wherein Justice Clark stated:
[tihe President, with the United States Senate concurring, may, on
behalf of the United States under the treaty power of the Constitution
ratify or adhere to any human rights convention that does not contra-
vene a specific constitutional prohibition . ...
Id. at 41.
204. The nineteenth amendment, unlike the Convention on the Political Rights
of Women, is silent on the right to run for and hold public offices; however, today in
the United States, if this right were denied, it would constitute an equal protection
violation. Id. at 44.
205. Accord, id. at 67.
206. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. Treaties and federal law are equal under the Con-
stitution. Since neither is superior, the later one in time prevails.
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value could serve to reinforce existing legislation."7 Since the
conventions dealing with protective labor regulations" 8 appear
to contradict contemporary legal opinion, these need not be
ratified.
Significantly, the signing of certain agreements could also
expand the rights of the American woman. For example, the
Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employ-
ment and Occupation is broader than Title VII in that it ap-
plies to everyone, and requires states to take affirmative action
to end discrimination. °' However, since the concept of affirma-
tive action is no* very controversial in this country, t 0 the
United States might consider making an appropriate reserva-
tion to avoid contradiction with future domestic law.
The concept of permissive affirmative action would also
have to be dealt with if the United States signs any treaties
dealing with economic, social or cultural rights. As stated ear-
lier, only civil and political rights are encompassed in our Con-
stitution; nondiscrimination in this context is generally ac-
knowledged to mean that the state must abstain from abridg-
ing the guaranteed rights. An example would be the nineteenth
amendment's mandate that the right to vote may not be denied
or abridged on account of sex. If the United States signs the
Draft Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, it demands that the state act to recognize
motherhood as a social function.'
In order to comply with this provision, state aid would be
a prerequisite."' Although several countries, e.g., France, Is-
rael, the Soviet Union, and Sweden, provide for this type of
aid,' such intervention runs counter to present American con-
stitutional thought. This factor would have to be dealt with in
any of the aforementioned conventions dealing with economic,
social or cultural rights. The United States should therefore
carefully scrutinize what kind of action ratification of these
treaties would entail before setting any precedent.
Despite these difficulties, it is hoped that the Senate will
207. See notes 141-46, 160-61 and accompanying text supra.
208. E.g., Night Work Convention, supra note 169; Convention on Underground
Work in Mines, supra note 170.
209. Guggenheim, supra note 126, at 67.
210. See, e.g., note 71 supra.
211. 1974 REPORT, supra note 185, at 36 (art. 5(1)).
212. Shelton, supra note 181, at 67-69.
213. Ginsburg, supra note 119, at 588.
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give careful consideration to the conventions outlined in this
comment. Understandably, the general human rights treaties
will entail a discussion of issues other than the prohibition
against sex-based discrimination. However, it is hoped that
careful attention will be given to the treaties dealing specifi-
cally with the rights of women in light of the rights already
granted to American women under national law, with a view
toward their expansion.
Finally, it is hoped that the United States will devote care-
ful consideration to the Convention on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women. It is encouraging that the United
States was represented and proposed amendments at the last
meeting of the working group which discussed the conven-
tion."' In light of the precarious position in which the ERA has
been placed, this Convention may have to replace a constitu-
tional amendment as the broad and definitive prohibition
against sex-based classifications. However, with or without the
ratification of an equal rights amendment or an international
convention, American lawyers litigating these cases should be
aware that treaty law has at its foundation the principle of
nondiscrimination. Therefore, even if the United States fails to
formally incorporate the international norm into its body of
law, it could be strongly argued that such treaties, which have
been acceded to by so many nations, form a part of customary
international law, which is also the law of the United States.' 5
CONCLUSION
In the United States, individuals concerned with women's
rights continue to strive toward the goal of equal treatment
between the sexes. Currently, this struggle is dramatized by
the somewhat polarized debate over the proposed ERA. With
the fate of the amendment uncertain, some supporters have
begun to look elsewhere for other weapons which can be uti-
lized in the fight for equality.
Clearly, one alternative to the ERA is relief through the
courts. Unfortunately, United States constitutional law has not
provided a sweeping pronouncement against sex-based dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court's issue-by-issue approach,
characterized by varying levels of scrutiny, has been unwilling
214. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/L716/Add.1, at 10 (1977); U.N. Doc. E/
CN.6/L681/Add.1, at 1, 5 (1977).
215. See McDougal, supra note 194, at 528 n.241.
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to recognize complete equality as the eventual goal-subject
only to some well-reasoned exceptions.
A push for ratification of the many existing international
conventions and the proposed Draft Convention could prove to
be a more fruitful alternative. International legislation promot-
ing equality has been much more wide ranging than United
States efforts. If these conventions were to become part of our
national law, the status of women would be considerably im-
proved.
In any event, regardless of its form, a prohibition against
all forms of sex-based discrimination needs to be adopted.
Without such a prohibition, women will retain a legally inferior
status. There is no compelling reason for such a status to be the
rule rather than the exception.
Lauren Easman- Taal

